feat(auth): release-validation pass for 2.0-rc — 12 blockers + simplify follow-ups (#2008)

* feat(auth): introduce backend auth module Port RFC-001 authentication core from PR #1728: - JWT token handling (create_access_token, decode_token, TokenPayload) - Password hashing (bcrypt) with verify_password - SQLite UserRepository with base interface - Provider Factory pattern (LocalAuthProvider) - CLI reset_admin tool - Auth-specific errors (AuthErrorCode, TokenError, AuthErrorResponse) Deps: - bcrypt>=4.0.0 - pyjwt>=2.9.0 - email-validator>=2.0.0 - backend/uv.toml pins public PyPI index Tests: 12 pure unit tests (test_auth_config.py, test_auth_errors.py). Scope note: authz.py, test_auth.py, and test_auth_type_system.py are deferred to commit 2 because they depend on middleware and deps wiring that is not yet in place. Commit 1 stays "pure new files only" as the spec mandates. * feat(auth): wire auth end-to-end (middleware + frontend replacement) Backend: - Port auth_middleware, csrf_middleware, langgraph_auth, routers/auth - Port authz decorator (owner_filter_key defaults to 'owner_id') - Merge app.py: register AuthMiddleware + CSRFMiddleware + CORS, add _ensure_admin_user lifespan hook, _migrate_orphaned_threads helper, register auth router - Merge deps.py: add get_local_provider, get_current_user_from_request, get_optional_user_from_request; keep get_current_user as thin str|None adapter for feedback router - langgraph.json: add auth path pointing to langgraph_auth.py:auth - Rename metadata['user_id'] -> metadata['owner_id'] in langgraph_auth (both metadata write and LangGraph filter dict) + test fixtures Frontend: - Delete better-auth library and api catch-all route - Remove better-auth npm dependency and env vars (BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, BETTER_AUTH_GITHUB_*) from env.js - Port frontend/src/core/auth/* (AuthProvider, gateway-config, proxy-policy, server-side getServerSideUser, types) - Port frontend/src/core/api/fetcher.ts - Port (auth)/layout, (auth)/login, (auth)/setup pages - Rewrite workspace/layout.tsx as server component that calls getServerSideUser and wraps in AuthProvider - Port workspace/workspace-content.tsx for the client-side sidebar logic Tests: - Port 5 auth test files (test_auth, test_auth_middleware, test_auth_type_system, test_ensure_admin, test_langgraph_auth) - 176 auth tests PASS After this commit: login/logout/registration flow works, but persistence layer does not yet filter by owner_id. Commit 4 closes that gap. * feat(auth): account settings page + i18n - Port account-settings-page.tsx (change password, change email, logout) - Wire into settings-dialog.tsx as new "account" section with UserIcon, rendered first in the section list - Add i18n keys: - en-US/zh-CN: settings.sections.account ("Account" / "账号") - en-US/zh-CN: button.logout ("Log out" / "退出登录") - types.ts: matching type declarations * feat(auth): enforce owner_id across 2.0-rc persistence layer Add request-scoped contextvar-based owner filtering to threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback repositories. Router code is unchanged — isolation is enforced at the storage layer so that any caller that forgets to pass owner_id still gets filtered results, and new routes cannot accidentally leak data. Core infrastructure ------------------- - deerflow/runtime/user_context.py (new): - ContextVar[CurrentUser | None] with default None - runtime_checkable CurrentUser Protocol (structural subtype with .id) - set/reset/get/require helpers - AUTO sentinel + resolve_owner_id(value, method_name) for sentinel three-state resolution: AUTO reads contextvar, explicit str overrides, explicit None bypasses the filter (for migration/CLI) Repository changes ------------------ - ThreadMetaRepository: create/get/search/update_*/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg; read paths filter by owner, writes stamp it, mutations check ownership before applying - RunRepository: put/get/list_by_thread/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg - FeedbackRepository: create/get/list_by_run/list_by_thread/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg - DbRunEventStore: list_messages/list_events/list_messages_by_run/ count_messages/delete_by_thread/delete_by_run gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg. Write paths (put/put_batch) read contextvar softly: when a request-scoped user is available, owner_id is stamped; background worker writes without a user context pass None which is valid (orphan row to be bound by migration) Schema ------ - persistence/models/run_event.py: RunEventRow.owner_id = Mapped[ str | None] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=True, index=True) - No alembic migration needed: 2.0 ships fresh, Base.metadata.create_all picks up the new column automatically Middleware ---------- - auth_middleware.py: after cookie check, call get_optional_user_from_ request to load the real User, stamp it into request.state.user AND the contextvar via set_current_user, reset in a try/finally. Public paths and unauthenticated requests continue without contextvar, and @require_auth handles the strict 401 path Test infrastructure ------------------- - tests/conftest.py: @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) _auto_user_context sets a default SimpleNamespace(id="test-user-autouse") on every test unless marked @pytest.mark.no_auto_user. Keeps existing 20+ persistence tests passing without modification - pyproject.toml [tool.pytest.ini_options]: register no_auto_user marker so pytest does not emit warnings for opt-out tests - tests/test_user_context.py: 6 tests covering three-state semantics, Protocol duck typing, and require/optional APIs - tests/test_thread_meta_repo.py: one test updated to pass owner_id= None explicitly where it was previously relying on the old default Test results ------------ - test_user_context.py: 6 passed - test_auth*.py + test_langgraph_auth.py + test_ensure_admin.py: 127 - test_run_event_store / test_run_repository / test_thread_meta_repo / test_feedback: 92 passed - Full backend suite: 1905 passed, 2 failed (both @requires_llm flaky integration tests unrelated to auth), 1 skipped * feat(auth): extend orphan migration to 2.0-rc persistence tables _ensure_admin_user now runs a three-step pipeline on every boot: Step 1 (fatal): admin user exists / is created / password is reset Step 2 (non-fatal): LangGraph store orphan threads → admin Step 3 (non-fatal): SQL persistence tables → admin - threads_meta - runs - run_events - feedback Each step is idempotent. The fatal/non-fatal split mirrors PR #1728's original philosophy: admin creation failure blocks startup (the system is unusable without an admin), whereas migration failures log a warning and let the service proceed (a partial migration is recoverable; a missing admin is not). Key helpers ----------- - _iter_store_items(store, namespace, *, page_size=500): async generator that cursor-paginates across LangGraph store pages. Fixes PR #1728's hardcoded limit=1000 bug that would silently lose orphans beyond the first page. - _migrate_orphaned_threads(store, admin_user_id): Rewritten to use _iter_store_items. Returns the migrated count so the caller can log it; raises only on unhandled exceptions. - _migrate_orphan_sql_tables(admin_user_id): Imports the 4 ORM models lazily, grabs the shared session factory, runs one UPDATE per table in a single transaction, commits once. No-op when no persistence backend is configured (in-memory dev). Tests: test_ensure_admin.py (8 passed) * test(auth): port AUTH test plan docs + lint/format pass - Port backend/docs/AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md and AUTH_UPGRADE.md from PR #1728 - Rename metadata.user_id → metadata.owner_id in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md (4 occurrences from the original PR doc) - ruff auto-fix UP037 in sentinel type annotations: drop quotes around "str | None | _AutoSentinel" now that from __future__ import annotations makes them implicit string forms - ruff format: 2 files (app/gateway/app.py, runtime/user_context.py) Note on test coverage additions: - conftest.py autouse fixture was already added in commit 4 (had to be co-located with the repository changes to keep pre-existing persistence tests passing) - cross-user isolation E2E tests (test_owner_isolation.py) deferred — enforcement is already proven by the 98-test repository suite via the autouse fixture + explicit _AUTO sentinel exercises - New test cases (TC-API-17..20, TC-ATK-13, TC-MIG-01..07) listed in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md are deferred to a follow-up PR — they are manual-QA test cases rather than pytest code, and the spec-level coverage is already met by test_user_context.py + the 98-test repository suite. Final test results: - Auth suite (test_auth*, test_langgraph_auth, test_ensure_admin, test_user_context): 186 passed - Persistence suite (test_run_event_store, test_run_repository, test_thread_meta_repo, test_feedback): 98 passed - Lint: ruff check + ruff format both clean * test(auth): add cross-user isolation test suite 10 tests exercising the storage-layer owner filter by manually switching the user_context contextvar between two users. Verifies the safety invariant: After a repository write with owner_id=A, a subsequent read with owner_id=B must not return the row, and vice versa. Covers all 4 tables that own user-scoped data: TC-API-17 threads_meta — read, search, update, delete cross-user TC-API-18 runs — get, list_by_thread, delete cross-user TC-API-19 run_events — list_messages, list_events, count_messages, delete_by_thread (CRITICAL: raw conversation content leak vector) TC-API-20 feedback — get, list_by_run, delete cross-user Plus two meta-tests verifying the sentinel pattern itself: - AUTO + unset contextvar raises RuntimeError - explicit owner_id=None bypasses the filter (migration escape hatch) Architecture note ----------------- These tests bypass the HTTP layer by design. The full chain (cookie → middleware → contextvar → repository) is covered piecewise: - test_auth_middleware.py: middleware sets contextvar from cookies - test_owner_isolation.py: repositories enforce isolation when contextvar is set to different users Together they prove the end-to-end safety property without the ceremony of spinning up a full TestClient + in-memory DB for every router endpoint. Tests pass: 231 (full auth + persistence + isolation suite) Lint: clean * refactor(auth): migrate user repository to SQLAlchemy ORM Move the users table into the shared persistence engine so auth matches the pattern of threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback — one engine, one session factory, one schema init codepath. New files --------- - persistence/user/__init__.py, persistence/user/model.py: UserRow ORM class with partial unique index on (oauth_provider, oauth_id) - Registered in persistence/models/__init__.py so Base.metadata.create_all() picks it up Modified -------- - auth/repositories/sqlite.py: rewritten as async SQLAlchemy, identical constructor pattern to the other four repositories (def __init__(self, session_factory) + self._sf = session_factory) - auth/config.py: drop users_db_path field — storage is configured through config.database like every other table - deps.py/get_local_provider: construct SQLiteUserRepository with the shared session factory, fail fast if engine is not initialised - tests/test_auth.py: rewrite test_sqlite_round_trip_new_fields to use the shared engine (init_engine + close_engine in a tempdir) - tests/test_auth_type_system.py: add per-test autouse fixture that spins up a scratch engine and resets deps._cached_* singletons * refactor(auth): remove SQL orphan migration (unused in supported scenarios) The _migrate_orphan_sql_tables helper existed to bind NULL owner_id rows in threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback to the admin on first boot. But in every supported upgrade path, it's a no-op: 1. Fresh install: create_all builds fresh tables, no legacy rows 2. No-auth → with-auth (no existing persistence DB): persistence tables are created fresh by create_all, no legacy rows 3. No-auth → with-auth (has existing persistence DB from #1930): NOT a supported upgrade path — "有 DB 到有 DB" schema evolution is out of scope; users wipe DB or run manual ALTER So the SQL orphan migration never has anything to do in the supported matrix. Delete the function, simplify _ensure_admin_user from a 3-step pipeline to a 2-step one (admin creation + LangGraph store orphan migration only). LangGraph store orphan migration stays: it serves the real "no-auth → with-auth" upgrade path where a user's existing LangGraph thread metadata has no owner_id field and needs to be stamped with the newly-created admin's id. Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation) Lint: clean * security(auth): write initial admin password to 0600 file instead of logs CodeQL py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data flagged 3 call sites that logged the auto-generated admin password to stdout via logger.info(). Production log aggregators (ELK/Splunk/etc) would have captured those cleartext secrets. Replace with a shared helper that writes to .deer-flow/admin_initial_credentials.txt with mode 0600, and log only the path. New file -------- - app/gateway/auth/credential_file.py: write_initial_credentials() helper. Takes email, password, and a "initial"/"reset" label. Creates .deer-flow/ if missing, writes a header comment plus the email+password, chmods 0o600, returns the absolute Path. Modified -------- - app/gateway/app.py: both _ensure_admin_user paths (fresh creation + needs_setup password reset) now write to file and log the path - app/gateway/auth/reset_admin.py: rewritten to use the shared ORM repo (SQLiteUserRepository with session_factory) and the credential_file helper. The previous implementation was broken after the earlier ORM refactor — it still imported _get_users_conn and constructed SQLiteUserRepository() without a session factory. No tests changed — the three password-log sites are all exercised via existing test_ensure_admin.py which checks that startup succeeds, not that a specific string appears in logs. CodeQL alerts 272, 283, 284: all resolved. * security(auth): strict JWT validation in middleware (fix junk cookie bypass) AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.8 expects junk cookies to be rejected with 401. The previous middleware behaviour was "presence-only": check that some access_token cookie exists, then pass through. In combination with my Task-12 decision to skip @require_auth decorators on routes, this created a gap where a request with any cookie-shaped string (e.g. access_token=not-a-jwt) would bypass authentication on routes that do not touch the repository (/api/models, /api/mcp/config, /api/memory, /api/skills, …). Fix: middleware now calls get_current_user_from_request() strictly and catches the resulting HTTPException to render a 401 with the proper fine-grained error code (token_invalid, token_expired, user_not_found, …). On success it stamps request.state.user and the contextvar so repository-layer owner filters work downstream. The 4 old "_with_cookie_passes" tests in test_auth_middleware.py were written for the presence-only behaviour; they asserted that a junk cookie would make the handler return 200. They are renamed to "_with_junk_cookie_rejected" and their assertions flipped to 401. The negative path (no cookie → 401 not_authenticated) is unchanged. Verified: no cookie → 401 not_authenticated junk cookie → 401 token_invalid (the fixed bug) expired cookie → 401 token_expired Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation) Lint: clean * security(auth): wire @require_permission(owner_check=True) on isolation routes Apply the require_permission decorator to all 28 routes that take a {thread_id} path parameter. Combined with the strict middleware (previous commit), this gives the double-layer protection that AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.9 documents: Layer 1 (AuthMiddleware): cookie + JWT validation, rejects junk cookies and stamps request.state.user Layer 2 (@require_permission with owner_check=True): per-resource ownership verification via ThreadMetaStore.check_access — returns 404 if a different user owns the thread The decorator's owner_check branch is rewritten to use the SQL thread_meta_repo (the 2.0-rc persistence layer) instead of the LangGraph store path that PR #1728 used (_store_get / get_store in routers/threads.py). The inject_record convenience is dropped — no caller in 2.0 needs the LangGraph blob, and the SQL repo has a different shape. Routes decorated (28 total): - threads.py: delete, patch, get, get-state, post-state, post-history - thread_runs.py: post-runs, post-runs-stream, post-runs-wait, list_runs, get_run, cancel_run, join_run, stream_existing_run, list_thread_messages, list_run_messages, list_run_events, thread_token_usage - feedback.py: create, list, stats, delete - uploads.py: upload (added Request param), list, delete - artifacts.py: get_artifact - suggestions.py: generate (renamed body parameter to avoid conflict with FastAPI Request) Test fixes: - test_suggestions_router.py: bypass the decorator via __wrapped__ (the unit tests cover parsing logic, not auth — no point spinning up a thread_meta_repo just to test JSON unwrapping) - test_auth_middleware.py 4 fake-cookie tests: already updated in the previous commit (745bf432) Tests: 293 passed (auth + persistence + isolation + suggestions) Lint: clean * security(auth): defense-in-depth fixes from release validation pass Eight findings caught while running the AUTH_TEST_PLAN end-to-end against the deployed sg_dev stack. Each is a pre-condition for shipping release/2.0-rc that the previous PRs missed. Backend hardening - routers/auth.py: rate limiter X-Real-IP now requires AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES whitelist (CIDR/IP allowlist). Without nginx in front, the previous code honored arbitrary X-Real-IP, letting an attacker rotate the header to fully bypass the per-IP login lockout. - routers/auth.py: 36-entry common-password blocklist via Pydantic field_validator on RegisterRequest + ChangePasswordRequest. The shared _validate_strong_password helper keeps the constraint in one place. - routers/threads.py: ThreadCreateRequest + ThreadPatchRequest strip server-reserved metadata keys (owner_id, user_id) via Pydantic field_validator so a forged value can never round-trip back to other clients reading the same thread. The actual ownership invariant stays on the threads_meta row; this closes the metadata-blob echo gap. - authz.py + thread_meta/sql.py: require_permission gains a require_existing flag plumbed through check_access(require_existing=True). Destructive routes (DELETE/PATCH/state-update/runs/feedback) now treat a missing thread_meta row as 404 instead of "untracked legacy thread, allow", closing the cross-user delete-idempotence gap where any user could successfully DELETE another user's deleted thread. - repositories/sqlite.py + base.py: update_user raises UserNotFoundError on a vanished row instead of silently returning the input. Concurrent delete during password reset can no longer look like a successful update. - runtime/user_context.py: resolve_owner_id() coerces User.id (UUID) to str at the contextvar boundary so SQLAlchemy String(64) columns can bind it. The whole 2.0-rc isolation pipeline was previously broken end-to-end (POST /api/threads → 500 "type 'UUID' is not supported"). - persistence/engine.py: SQLAlchemy listener enables PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL, synchronous=NORMAL, foreign_keys=ON on every new SQLite connection. TC-UPG-06 in the test plan expects WAL; previous code shipped with the default 'delete' journal. - auth_middleware.py: stamp request.state.auth = AuthContext(...) so @require_permission's short-circuit fires; previously every isolation request did a duplicate JWT decode + users SELECT. Also unifies the 401 payload through AuthErrorResponse(...).model_dump(). - app.py: _ensure_admin_user restructure removes the noqa F821 scoping bug where 'password' was referenced outside the branch that defined it. New _announce_credentials helper absorbs the duplicate log block in the fresh-admin and reset-admin branches. * fix(frontend+nginx): rollout CSRF on every state-changing client path The frontend was 100% broken in gateway-pro mode for any user trying to open a specific chat thread. Three cumulative bugs each silently masked the next. LangGraph SDK CSRF gap (api-client.ts) - The Client constructor took only apiUrl, no defaultHeaders, no fetch interceptor. The SDK's internal fetch never sent X-CSRF-Token, so every state-changing /api/langgraph-compat/* call (runs/stream, threads/search, threads/{tid}/history, ...) hit CSRFMiddleware and got 403 before reaching the auth check. UI symptom: empty thread page with no error message; the SPA's hooks swallowed the rejection. - Fix: pass an onRequest hook that injects X-CSRF-Token from the csrf_token cookie per request. Reading the cookie per call (not at construction time) handles login / logout / password-change cookie rotation transparently. The SDK's prepareFetchOptions calls onRequest for both regular requests AND streaming/SSE/reconnect, so the same hook covers runs.stream and runs.joinStream. Raw fetch CSRF gap (7 files) - Audit: 11 frontend fetch sites, only 2 included CSRF (login/setup + account-settings change-password). The other 7 routed through raw fetch() with no header — suggestions, memory, agents, mcp, skills, uploads, and the local thread cleanup hook all 403'd silently. - Fix: enhance fetcher.ts:fetchWithAuth to auto-inject X-CSRF-Token on POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH from a single shared readCsrfCookie() helper. Convert all 7 raw fetch() callers to fetchWithAuth so the contract is centrally enforced. api-client.ts and fetcher.ts share readCsrfCookie + STATE_CHANGING_METHODS to avoid drift. nginx routing + buffering (nginx.local.conf) - The auth feature shipped without updating the nginx config: per-API explicit location blocks but no /api/v1/auth/, /api/feedback, /api/runs. The frontend's client-side fetches to /api/v1/auth/login/local 404'd from the Next.js side because nginx routed /api/* to the frontend. - Fix: add catch-all `location /api/` that proxies to the gateway. nginx longest-prefix matching keeps the explicit blocks (/api/models, /api/threads regex, /api/langgraph/, ...) winning for their paths. - Fix: disable proxy_buffering + proxy_request_buffering for the frontend `location /` block. Without it, nginx tries to spool large Next.js chunks into /var/lib/nginx/proxy (root-owned) and fails with Permission denied → ERR_INCOMPLETE_CHUNKED_ENCODING → ChunkLoadError. * test(auth): release-validation test infra and new coverage Test fixtures and unit tests added during the validation pass. Router test helpers (NEW: tests/_router_auth_helpers.py) - make_authed_test_app(): builds a FastAPI test app with a stub middleware that stamps request.state.user + request.state.auth and a permissive thread_meta_repo mock. TestClient-based router tests (test_artifacts_router, test_threads_router) use it instead of bare FastAPI() so the new @require_permission(owner_check=True) decorators short-circuit cleanly. - call_unwrapped(): walks the __wrapped__ chain to invoke the underlying handler without going through the authz wrappers. Direct-call tests (test_uploads_router) use it. Typed with ParamSpec so the wrapped signature flows through. Backend test additions - test_auth.py: 7 tests for the new _get_client_ip trust model (no proxy / trusted proxy / untrusted peer / XFF rejection / invalid CIDR / no client). 5 tests for the password blocklist (literal, case-insensitive, strong password accepted, change-password binding, short-password length-check still fires before blocklist). test_update_user_raises_when_row_concurrently_deleted: closes a shipped-without-coverage gap on the new UserNotFoundError contract. - test_thread_meta_repo.py: 4 tests for check_access(require_existing=True) — strict missing-row denial, strict owner match, strict owner mismatch, strict null-owner still allowed (shared rows survive the tightening). - test_ensure_admin.py: 3 tests for _migrate_orphaned_threads / _iter_store_items pagination, covering the TC-UPG-02 upgrade story end-to-end via mock store. Closes the gap where the cursor pagination was untested even though the previous PR rewrote it. - test_threads_router.py: 5 tests for _strip_reserved_metadata (owner_id removal, user_id removal, safe-keys passthrough, empty input, both-stripped). - test_auth_type_system.py: replace "password123" fixtures with Tr0ub4dor3a / AnotherStr0ngPwd! so the new password blocklist doesn't reject the test data. * docs(auth): refresh TC-DOCKER-05 + document Docker validation gap - AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md TC-DOCKER-05: the previous expectation ("admin password visible in docker logs") was stale after the simplify pass that moved credentials to a 0600 file. The grep "Password:" check would have silently failed and given a false sense of coverage. New expectation matches the actual file-based path: 0600 file in DEER_FLOW_HOME, log shows the path (not the secret), reverse-grep asserts no leaked password in container logs. - NEW: docs/AUTH_TEST_DOCKER_GAP.md documents the only un-executed block in the test plan (TC-DOCKER-01..06). Reason: sg_dev validation host has no Docker daemon installed. The doc maps each Docker case to an already-validated bare-metal equivalent (TC-1.1, TC-REENT-01, TC-API-02 etc.) so the gap is auditable, and includes pre-flight reproduction steps for whoever has Docker available. --------- Co-authored-by: greatmengqi <chenmengqi.0376@bytedance.com>
2026-04-09 11:29:32 +08:00
parent d8ecaf46c9
commit 94eee95fe0
92 changed files with 9154 additions and 441 deletions
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ from urllib.parse import quote
 from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
 from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, PlainTextResponse, Response

+from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
 from app.gateway.path_utils import resolve_thread_virtual_path

 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ def _extract_file_from_skill_archive(zip_path: Path, internal_path: str) -> byte
    summary="Get Artifact File",
    description="Retrieve an artifact file generated by the AI agent. Text and binary files can be viewed inline, while active web content is always downloaded.",
 )
+@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def get_artifact(thread_id: str, path: str, request: Request, download: bool = False) -> Response:
    """Get an artifact file by its path.

@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
+"""Authentication endpoints."""
+
+import logging
+import os
+import time
+from ipaddress import ip_address, ip_network
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
+from fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordRequestForm
+from pydantic import BaseModel, EmailStr, Field, field_validator
+
+from app.gateway.auth import (
+    UserResponse,
+    create_access_token,
+)
+from app.gateway.auth.config import get_auth_config
+from app.gateway.auth.errors import AuthErrorCode, AuthErrorResponse
+from app.gateway.csrf_middleware import is_secure_request
+from app.gateway.deps import get_current_user_from_request, get_local_provider
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/auth", tags=["auth"])
+
+
+# ── Request/Response Models ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+class LoginResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Response model for login — token only lives in HttpOnly cookie."""
+
+    expires_in: int  # seconds
+    needs_setup: bool = False
+
+
+# Top common-password blocklist. Drawn from the public SecLists "10k worst
+# passwords" set, lowercased + length>=8 only (shorter ones already fail
+# the min_length check). Kept tight on purpose: this is the **lower bound**
+# defense, not a full HIBP / passlib check, and runs in-process per request.
+_COMMON_PASSWORDS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
+    {
+        "password",
+        "password1",
+        "password12",
+        "password123",
+        "password1234",
+        "12345678",
+        "123456789",
+        "1234567890",
+        "qwerty12",
+        "qwertyui",
+        "qwerty123",
+        "abc12345",
+        "abcd1234",
+        "iloveyou",
+        "letmein1",
+        "welcome1",
+        "welcome123",
+        "admin123",
+        "administrator",
+        "passw0rd",
+        "p@ssw0rd",
+        "monkey12",
+        "trustno1",
+        "sunshine",
+        "princess",
+        "football",
+        "baseball",
+        "superman",
+        "batman123",
+        "starwars",
+        "dragon123",
+        "master123",
+        "shadow12",
+        "michael1",
+        "jennifer",
+        "computer",
+    }
+)
+
+
+def _password_is_common(password: str) -> bool:
+    """Case-insensitive blocklist check.
+
+    Lowercases the input so trivial mutations like ``Password`` /
+    ``PASSWORD`` are also rejected. Does not normalize digit substitutions
+    (``p@ssw0rd`` is included as a literal entry instead) — keeping the
+    rule cheap and predictable.
+    """
+    return password.lower() in _COMMON_PASSWORDS
+
+
+def _validate_strong_password(value: str) -> str:
+    """Pydantic field-validator body shared by Register + ChangePassword.
+
+    Constraint = function, not type-level mixin. The two request models
+    have no "is-a" relationship; they only share the password-strength
+    rule. Lifting it into a free function lets each model bind it via
+    ``@field_validator(field_name)`` without inheritance gymnastics.
+    """
+    if _password_is_common(value):
+        raise ValueError("Password is too common; choose a stronger password.")
+    return value
+
+
+class RegisterRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request model for user registration."""
+
+    email: EmailStr
+    password: str = Field(..., min_length=8)
+
+    _strong_password = field_validator("password")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _validate_strong_password(v)))
+
+
+class ChangePasswordRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Request model for password change (also handles setup flow)."""
+
+    current_password: str
+    new_password: str = Field(..., min_length=8)
+    new_email: EmailStr | None = None
+
+    _strong_password = field_validator("new_password")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _validate_strong_password(v)))
+
+
+class MessageResponse(BaseModel):
+    """Generic message response."""
+
+    message: str
+
+
+# ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _set_session_cookie(response: Response, token: str, request: Request) -> None:
+    """Set the access_token HttpOnly cookie on the response."""
+    config = get_auth_config()
+    is_https = is_secure_request(request)
+    response.set_cookie(
+        key="access_token",
+        value=token,
+        httponly=True,
+        secure=is_https,
+        samesite="lax",
+        max_age=config.token_expiry_days * 24 * 3600 if is_https else None,
+    )
+
+
+# ── Rate Limiting ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# In-process dict — not shared across workers. Sufficient for single-worker deployments.
+
+_MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS = 5
+_LOCKOUT_SECONDS = 300  # 5 minutes
+
+# ip → (fail_count, lock_until_timestamp)
+_login_attempts: dict[str, tuple[int, float]] = {}
+
+
+def _trusted_proxies() -> list:
+    """Parse ``AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES`` env var into a list of ip_network objects.
+
+    Comma-separated CIDR or single-IP entries. Empty / unset = no proxy is
+    trusted (direct mode). Invalid entries are skipped with a logger warning.
+    Read live so env-var overrides take effect immediately and tests can
+    ``monkeypatch.setenv`` without poking a module-level cache.
+    """
+    raw = os.getenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "").strip()
+    if not raw:
+        return []
+    nets = []
+    for entry in raw.split(","):
+        entry = entry.strip()
+        if not entry:
+            continue
+        try:
+            nets.append(ip_network(entry, strict=False))
+        except ValueError:
+            logger.warning("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES: ignoring invalid entry %r", entry)
+    return nets
+
+
+def _get_client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
+    """Extract the real client IP for rate limiting.
+
+    Trust model:
+
+    - The TCP peer (``request.client.host``) is always the baseline. It is
+      whatever the kernel reports as the connecting socket — unforgeable
+      by the client itself.
+    - ``X-Real-IP`` is **only** honored if the TCP peer is in the
+      ``AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES`` allowlist (set via env var, comma-separated
+      CIDR or single IPs). When set, the gateway is assumed to be behind a
+      reverse proxy (nginx, Cloudflare, ALB, …) that overwrites
+      ``X-Real-IP`` with the original client address.
+    - With no ``AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES`` set, ``X-Real-IP`` is silently
+      ignored — closing the bypass where any client could rotate the
+      header to dodge per-IP rate limits in dev / direct-gateway mode.
+
+    ``X-Forwarded-For`` is intentionally NOT used because it is naturally
+    client-controlled at the *first* hop and the trust chain is harder to
+    audit per-request.
+    """
+    peer_host = request.client.host if request.client else None
+
+    trusted = _trusted_proxies()
+    if trusted and peer_host:
+        try:
+            peer_ip = ip_address(peer_host)
+            if any(peer_ip in net for net in trusted):
+                real_ip = request.headers.get("x-real-ip", "").strip()
+                if real_ip:
+                    return real_ip
+        except ValueError:
+            # peer_host wasn't a parseable IP (e.g. "unknown") — fall through
+            pass
+
+    return peer_host or "unknown"
+
+
+def _check_rate_limit(ip: str) -> None:
+    """Raise 429 if the IP is currently locked out."""
+    record = _login_attempts.get(ip)
+    if record is None:
+        return
+    fail_count, lock_until = record
+    if fail_count >= _MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS:
+        if time.time() < lock_until:
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=429,
+                detail="Too many login attempts. Try again later.",
+            )
+        del _login_attempts[ip]
+
+
+_MAX_TRACKED_IPS = 10000
+
+
+def _record_login_failure(ip: str) -> None:
+    """Record a failed login attempt for the given IP."""
+    # Evict expired lockouts when dict grows too large
+    if len(_login_attempts) >= _MAX_TRACKED_IPS:
+        now = time.time()
+        expired = [k for k, (c, t) in _login_attempts.items() if c >= _MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS and now >= t]
+        for k in expired:
+            del _login_attempts[k]
+        # If still too large, evict cheapest-to-lose half: below-threshold
+        # IPs (lock_until=0.0) sort first, then earliest-expiring lockouts.
+        if len(_login_attempts) >= _MAX_TRACKED_IPS:
+            by_time = sorted(_login_attempts.items(), key=lambda kv: kv[1][1])
+            for k, _ in by_time[: len(by_time) // 2]:
+                del _login_attempts[k]
+
+    record = _login_attempts.get(ip)
+    if record is None:
+        _login_attempts[ip] = (1, 0.0)
+    else:
+        new_count = record[0] + 1
+        lock_until = time.time() + _LOCKOUT_SECONDS if new_count >= _MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS else 0.0
+        _login_attempts[ip] = (new_count, lock_until)
+
+
+def _record_login_success(ip: str) -> None:
+    """Clear failure counter for the given IP on successful login."""
+    _login_attempts.pop(ip, None)
+
+
+# ── Endpoints ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+@router.post("/login/local", response_model=LoginResponse)
+async def login_local(
+    request: Request,
+    response: Response,
+    form_data: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends(),
+):
+    """Local email/password login."""
+    client_ip = _get_client_ip(request)
+    _check_rate_limit(client_ip)
+
+    user = await get_local_provider().authenticate({"email": form_data.username, "password": form_data.password})
+
+    if user is None:
+        _record_login_failure(client_ip)
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS, message="Incorrect email or password").model_dump(),
+        )
+
+    _record_login_success(client_ip)
+    token = create_access_token(str(user.id), token_version=user.token_version)
+    _set_session_cookie(response, token, request)
+
+    return LoginResponse(
+        expires_in=get_auth_config().token_expiry_days * 24 * 3600,
+        needs_setup=user.needs_setup,
+    )
+
+
+@router.post("/register", response_model=UserResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
+async def register(request: Request, response: Response, body: RegisterRequest):
+    """Register a new user account (always 'user' role).
+
+    Admin is auto-created on first boot. This endpoint creates regular users.
+    Auto-login by setting the session cookie.
+    """
+    try:
+        user = await get_local_provider().create_user(email=body.email, password=body.password, system_role="user")
+    except ValueError:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+            detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.EMAIL_ALREADY_EXISTS, message="Email already registered").model_dump(),
+        )
+
+    token = create_access_token(str(user.id), token_version=user.token_version)
+    _set_session_cookie(response, token, request)
+
+    return UserResponse(id=str(user.id), email=user.email, system_role=user.system_role)
+
+
+@router.post("/logout", response_model=MessageResponse)
+async def logout(request: Request, response: Response):
+    """Logout current user by clearing the cookie."""
+    response.delete_cookie(key="access_token", secure=is_secure_request(request), samesite="lax")
+    return MessageResponse(message="Successfully logged out")
+
+
+@router.post("/change-password", response_model=MessageResponse)
+async def change_password(request: Request, response: Response, body: ChangePasswordRequest):
+    """Change password for the currently authenticated user.
+
+    Also handles the first-boot setup flow:
+    - If new_email is provided, updates email (checks uniqueness)
+    - If user.needs_setup is True and new_email is given, clears needs_setup
+    - Always increments token_version to invalidate old sessions
+    - Re-issues session cookie with new token_version
+    """
+    from app.gateway.auth.password import hash_password_async, verify_password_async
+
+    user = await get_current_user_from_request(request)
+
+    if user.password_hash is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS, message="OAuth users cannot change password").model_dump())
+
+    if not await verify_password_async(body.current_password, user.password_hash):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS, message="Current password is incorrect").model_dump())
+
+    provider = get_local_provider()
+
+    # Update email if provided
+    if body.new_email is not None:
+        existing = await provider.get_user_by_email(body.new_email)
+        if existing and str(existing.id) != str(user.id):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.EMAIL_ALREADY_EXISTS, message="Email already in use").model_dump())
+        user.email = body.new_email
+
+    # Update password + bump version
+    user.password_hash = await hash_password_async(body.new_password)
+    user.token_version += 1
+
+    # Clear setup flag if this is the setup flow
+    if user.needs_setup and body.new_email is not None:
+        user.needs_setup = False
+
+    await provider.update_user(user)
+
+    # Re-issue cookie with new token_version
+    token = create_access_token(str(user.id), token_version=user.token_version)
+    _set_session_cookie(response, token, request)
+
+    return MessageResponse(message="Password changed successfully")
+
+
+@router.get("/me", response_model=UserResponse)
+async def get_me(request: Request):
+    """Get current authenticated user info."""
+    user = await get_current_user_from_request(request)
+    return UserResponse(id=str(user.id), email=user.email, system_role=user.system_role, needs_setup=user.needs_setup)
+
+
+@router.get("/setup-status")
+async def setup_status():
+    """Check if admin account exists. Always False after first boot."""
+    user_count = await get_local_provider().count_users()
+    return {"needs_setup": user_count == 0}
+
+
+# ── OAuth Endpoints (Future/Placeholder) ─────────────────────────────────
+
+
+@router.get("/oauth/{provider}")
+async def oauth_login(provider: str):
+    """Initiate OAuth login flow.
+
+    Redirects to the OAuth provider's authorization URL.
+    Currently a placeholder - requires OAuth provider implementation.
+    """
+    if provider not in ["github", "google"]:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+            detail=f"Unsupported OAuth provider: {provider}",
+        )
+
+    raise HTTPException(
+        status_code=status.HTTP_501_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
+        detail="OAuth login not yet implemented",
+    )
+
+
+@router.get("/callback/{provider}")
+async def oauth_callback(provider: str, code: str, state: str):
+    """OAuth callback endpoint.
+
+    Handles the OAuth provider's callback after user authorization.
+    Currently a placeholder.
+    """
+    raise HTTPException(
+        status_code=status.HTTP_501_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
+        detail="OAuth callback not yet implemented",
+    )
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from typing import Any
 from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
 from pydantic import BaseModel, Field

+from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
 from app.gateway.deps import get_current_user, get_feedback_repo, get_run_store

 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ class FeedbackStatsResponse(BaseModel):


@router.post("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/feedback", response_model=FeedbackResponse)
+@require_permission("threads", "write", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
 async def create_feedback(
    thread_id: str,
    run_id: str,
@@ -85,6 +87,7 @@ async def create_feedback(


@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/feedback", response_model=list[FeedbackResponse])
+@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def list_feedback(
    thread_id: str,
    run_id: str,
@@ -96,6 +99,7 @@ async def list_feedback(


@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/feedback/stats", response_model=FeedbackStatsResponse)
+@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def feedback_stats(
    thread_id: str,
    run_id: str,
@@ -107,6 +111,7 @@ async def feedback_stats(


@router.delete("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/feedback/{feedback_id}")
+@require_permission("threads", "delete", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
 async def delete_feedback(
    thread_id: str,
    run_id: str,
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 import json
 import logging

-from fastapi import APIRouter
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
 from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage
 from pydantic import BaseModel, Field

+from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
 from deerflow.models import create_chat_model

 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -98,12 +99,13 @@ def _format_conversation(messages: list[SuggestionMessage]) -> str:
    summary="Generate Follow-up Questions",
    description="Generate short follow-up questions a user might ask next, based on recent conversation context.",
 )
-async def generate_suggestions(thread_id: str, request: SuggestionsRequest) -> SuggestionsResponse:
-    if not request.messages:
+@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
+async def generate_suggestions(thread_id: str, body: SuggestionsRequest) -> SuggestionsResponse:
+    if not body.messages:
        return SuggestionsResponse(suggestions=[])

-    n = request.n
-    conversation = _format_conversation(request.messages)
+    n = body.n
+    conversation = _format_conversation(body.messages)
    if not conversation:
        return SuggestionsResponse(suggestions=[])

@@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ async def generate_suggestions(thread_id: str, request: SuggestionsRequest) -> S
    user_content = f"Conversation Context:\n{conversation}\n\nGenerate {n} follow-up questions"

    try:
-        model = create_chat_model(name=request.model_name, thinking_enabled=False)
+        model = create_chat_model(name=body.model_name, thinking_enabled=False)
        response = await model.ainvoke([SystemMessage(content=system_instruction), HumanMessage(content=user_content)], config={"run_name": "suggest_agent"})
        raw = _extract_response_text(response.content)
        suggestions = _parse_json_string_list(raw) or []
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Query, Request
 from fastapi.responses import Response, StreamingResponse
 from pydantic import BaseModel, Field

+from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
 from app.gateway.deps import get_checkpointer, get_run_event_store, get_run_manager, get_run_store, get_stream_bridge
 from app.gateway.services import sse_consumer, start_run
 from deerflow.runtime import RunRecord, serialize_channel_values
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ def _record_to_response(record: RunRecord) -> RunResponse:


@router.post("/{thread_id}/runs", response_model=RunResponse)
+@require_permission("runs", "create", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
 async def create_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) -> RunResponse:
    """Create a background run (returns immediately)."""
    record = await start_run(body, thread_id, request)
@@ -100,6 +102,7 @@ async def create_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) -


@router.post("/{thread_id}/runs/stream")
+@require_permission("runs", "create", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
 async def stream_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) -> StreamingResponse:
    """Create a run and stream events via SSE.

@@ -127,6 +130,7 @@ async def stream_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) -


@router.post("/{thread_id}/runs/wait", response_model=dict)
+@require_permission("runs", "create", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
 async def wait_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) -> dict:
    """Create a run and block until it completes, returning the final state."""
    record = await start_run(body, thread_id, request)
@@ -152,6 +156,7 @@ async def wait_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) ->


@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs", response_model=list[RunResponse])
+@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def list_runs(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> list[RunResponse]:
    """List all runs for a thread."""
    run_mgr = get_run_manager(request)
@@ -160,6 +165,7 @@ async def list_runs(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> list[RunResponse]:


@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}", response_model=RunResponse)
+@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def get_run(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> RunResponse:
    """Get details of a specific run."""
    run_mgr = get_run_manager(request)
@@ -170,6 +176,7 @@ async def get_run(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> RunResponse:


@router.post("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/cancel")
+@require_permission("runs", "cancel", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
 async def cancel_run(
    thread_id: str,
    run_id: str,
@@ -207,6 +214,7 @@ async def cancel_run(


@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/join")
+@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def join_run(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> StreamingResponse:
    """Join an existing run's SSE stream."""
    bridge = get_stream_bridge(request)
@@ -227,6 +235,7 @@ async def join_run(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> StreamingRe


@router.api_route("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/stream", methods=["GET", "POST"], response_model=None)
+@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def stream_existing_run(
    thread_id: str,
    run_id: str,
@@ -274,6 +283,7 @@ async def stream_existing_run(


@router.get("/{thread_id}/messages")
+@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def list_thread_messages(
    thread_id: str,
    request: Request,
@@ -287,6 +297,7 @@ async def list_thread_messages(


@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/messages")
+@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def list_run_messages(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> list[dict]:
    """Return displayable messages for a specific run."""
    event_store = get_run_event_store(request)
@@ -294,6 +305,7 @@ async def list_run_messages(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> li


@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/events")
+@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def list_run_events(
    thread_id: str,
    run_id: str,
@@ -308,6 +320,7 @@ async def list_run_events(


@router.get("/{thread_id}/token-usage")
+@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def thread_token_usage(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> dict:
    """Thread-level token usage aggregation."""
    run_store = get_run_store(request)
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@ import uuid
 from typing import Any

 from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
-from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator

+from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
 from app.gateway.deps import get_checkpointer
 from app.gateway.utils import sanitize_log_param
 from deerflow.config.paths import Paths, get_paths
@@ -29,6 +30,22 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/threads", tags=["threads"])


+# Metadata keys that the server controls; clients are not allowed to set
+# them. Pydantic ``@field_validator("metadata")`` strips them on every
+# inbound model below so a malicious client cannot reflect a forged
+# owner identity through the API surface. Defense-in-depth — the
+# row-level invariant is still ``threads_meta.owner_id`` populated from
+# the auth contextvar; this list closes the metadata-blob echo gap.
+_SERVER_RESERVED_METADATA_KEYS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"owner_id", "user_id"})
+
+
+def _strip_reserved_metadata(metadata: dict[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return ``metadata`` with server-controlled keys removed."""
+    if not metadata:
+        return metadata or {}
+    return {k: v for k, v in metadata.items() if k not in _SERVER_RESERVED_METADATA_KEYS}
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Response / request models
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -60,6 +77,8 @@ class ThreadCreateRequest(BaseModel):
    assistant_id: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Associate thread with an assistant")
    metadata: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Initial metadata")

+    _strip_reserved = field_validator("metadata")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _strip_reserved_metadata(v)))
+

 class ThreadSearchRequest(BaseModel):
    """Request body for searching threads."""
@@ -88,6 +107,8 @@ class ThreadPatchRequest(BaseModel):

    metadata: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Metadata to merge")

+    _strip_reserved = field_validator("metadata")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _strip_reserved_metadata(v)))
+

 class ThreadStateUpdateRequest(BaseModel):
    """Request body for updating thread state (human-in-the-loop resume)."""
@@ -165,6 +186,7 @@ def _derive_thread_status(checkpoint_tuple) -> str:


@router.delete("/{thread_id}", response_model=ThreadDeleteResponse)
+@require_permission("threads", "delete", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
 async def delete_thread_data(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadDeleteResponse:
    """Delete local persisted filesystem data for a thread.

@@ -211,6 +233,8 @@ async def create_thread(body: ThreadCreateRequest, request: Request) -> ThreadRe
    thread_meta_repo = get_thread_meta_repo(request)
    thread_id = body.thread_id or str(uuid.uuid4())
    now = time.time()
+    # ``body.metadata`` is already stripped of server-reserved keys by
+    # ``ThreadCreateRequest._strip_reserved`` — see the model definition.

    # Idempotency: return existing record when already present
    existing_record = await thread_meta_repo.get(thread_id)
@@ -293,6 +317,7 @@ async def search_threads(body: ThreadSearchRequest, request: Request) -> list[Th


@router.patch("/{thread_id}", response_model=ThreadResponse)
+@require_permission("threads", "write", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
 async def patch_thread(thread_id: str, body: ThreadPatchRequest, request: Request) -> ThreadResponse:
    """Merge metadata into a thread record."""
    from app.gateway.deps import get_thread_meta_repo
@@ -302,6 +327,7 @@ async def patch_thread(thread_id: str, body: ThreadPatchRequest, request: Reques
    if record is None:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Thread {thread_id} not found")

+    # ``body.metadata`` already stripped by ``ThreadPatchRequest._strip_reserved``.
    try:
        await thread_meta_repo.update_metadata(thread_id, body.metadata)
    except Exception:
@@ -320,6 +346,7 @@ async def patch_thread(thread_id: str, body: ThreadPatchRequest, request: Reques


@router.get("/{thread_id}", response_model=ThreadResponse)
+@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadResponse:
    """Get thread info.

@@ -376,6 +403,7 @@ async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadResponse:


@router.get("/{thread_id}/state", response_model=ThreadStateResponse)
+@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def get_thread_state(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadStateResponse:
    """Get the latest state snapshot for a thread.

@@ -425,6 +453,7 @@ async def get_thread_state(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadStateRespo


@router.post("/{thread_id}/state", response_model=ThreadStateResponse)
+@require_permission("threads", "write", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
 async def update_thread_state(thread_id: str, body: ThreadStateUpdateRequest, request: Request) -> ThreadStateResponse:
    """Update thread state (e.g. for human-in-the-loop resume or title rename).

@@ -514,6 +543,7 @@ async def update_thread_state(thread_id: str, body: ThreadStateUpdateRequest, re


@router.post("/{thread_id}/history", response_model=list[HistoryEntry])
+@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
 async def get_thread_history(thread_id: str, body: ThreadHistoryRequest, request: Request) -> list[HistoryEntry]:
    """Get checkpoint history for a thread.

@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ import logging
 import os
 import stat

-from fastapi import APIRouter, File, HTTPException, UploadFile
+from fastapi import APIRouter, File, HTTPException, Request, UploadFile
 from pydantic import BaseModel

+from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
 from deerflow.config.app_config import get_app_config
 from deerflow.config.paths import get_paths
 from deerflow.sandbox.sandbox_provider import SandboxProvider, get_sandbox_provider
@@ -83,8 +84,10 @@ def _auto_convert_documents_enabled() -> bool:


@router.post("", response_model=UploadResponse)
+@require_permission("threads", "write", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
 async def upload_files(
    thread_id: str,
+    request: Request,
    files: list[UploadFile] = File(...),
 ) -> UploadResponse:
    """Upload multiple files to a thread's uploads directory."""
@@ -166,7 +169,8 @@ async def upload_files(


@router.get("/list", response_model=dict)
-async def list_uploaded_files(thread_id: str) -> dict:
+@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
+async def list_uploaded_files(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> dict:
    """List all files in a thread's uploads directory."""
    try:
        uploads_dir = get_uploads_dir(thread_id)
@@ -184,7 +188,8 @@ async def list_uploaded_files(thread_id: str) -> dict:


@router.delete("/{filename}")
-async def delete_uploaded_file(thread_id: str, filename: str) -> dict:
+@require_permission("threads", "delete", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
+async def delete_uploaded_file(thread_id: str, filename: str, request: Request) -> dict:
    """Delete a file from a thread's uploads directory."""
    try:
        uploads_dir = get_uploads_dir(thread_id)